Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935
The British and German governments agreed to a German naval limit of 35% of the British Commonwealth. Arguably, these were the first steps towards the British policy of Appeasement.
Earlier naval agreements had been made since the end of the First World War to limit an arms race. This may have been yet one more although is more likely to been part of a grander strategy to safeguard British and imperial interests. Several factors led to the idea of a naval alliance with Germany:
- The Royal Navy did not want any more ‘dreadnoughts’, ships that were technologically ahead of all others. This would make the bulk of their navy obsolete once again.
- The Japanese terminating their adherence to the Five Power Treaty of 1922. Britain wanted security for their colonies in Asia so, although wanted a renewed alliance with Japan (like 1902) the US pressured her not to do so; Japan’s actions in Manchuria showed their own imperial ambitions. So Britain needed more ships in Asia to safeguard Hong Kong, Singapore and the Dominions. Reducing the threat in the North Sea was therefore advantageous to Britain.
- The US was isolationist during the 1920s and 1930s so there was little help in them maintaining global security. Britain had to take action themselves.
- The Depression had hit Britain like most countries so there was not the revenue or political will to massively increase naval defence spending and maintain a significant presence in both Europe and the Far East.
- Germany may accept an agreement as it would legally allow them to rearm (although Hitler threw out the Versailles Treaty after taking power, he knew his armed forces were unprepared for war. He was also aware that the British would oppose a build up of naval forces without regulation; why antagonise them and make future diplomacy difficult?). Furthermore, a limit to Germany’s naval power would buy Britain time – it would take years for the Third Reich to build a force capable of fighting the Royal Navy.
- Germany knew that an agreement with Britain would alienate the French, a tactic used before the First World War!
- Britain understood the perils of Nazi Germany but were mindful of realpolitik, they would rearm anyway (Hitler authorised the building of twelve 250-ton submarines) in April 1935) so a deal would be preferred. This despite the signing of the Stresa Front two months before the naval agreement, where Italy, Britain and France condemned Germany’s reintroduction of conscription. Furthermore, memories of the First World War were still vivid so avoiding another conflict was foremost in the government’s minds.
- The Treaty of Versailles began to be revised in the 1920s, economist John Maynard Keynes was particularly influential in arguing the deal was too harsh on Germany.
- Disarmament was seen by the British Foreign Office and the Admiralty as an obstacle to government policy and the future of the country. Signing an agreement would end this ‘idealistic’ policy.
Germany and Britain both gained from the agreement. Germany added that submarines were not part of the ‘35%’ and negotiated 45% for these instead. This figure was decided upon by the German Navy staff as anymore was thought to arouse suspicion of future plans. Hindsight would prove the British naive, as many were seen to be in the 1940s.
Reactions to the Agreement:
- Japan was pleased as it ensured the British kept more of their shipping in Europe.